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Abstract. Efficient and truthful mechanisms to price resources on re-
mote servers/machines has been the subject of much work in recent years
due to the importance of the cloud market. This paper considers revenue
maximization in the online stochastic setting with non-preemptive jobs
and a unit capacity server. One agent/job arrives at every time step,
with parameters drawn from an underlying unknown distribution.
We design a posted-price mechanism which can be efficiently computed,
and is revenue-optimal in expectation and in retrospect, up to additive
error. The prices are posted prior to learning the agent’s type, and the
computed pricing scheme is deterministic, depending only on the length
of the allotted time interval and on the earliest time the server is avail-
able. If the distribution of agent’s type is only learned from observing the
jobs that are executed, we prove that a polynomial number of samples
is sufficient to obtain a near-optimal truthful pricing strategy.
Keywords: Posted prices · Online scheduling · Server pricing
1 Introduction
Designing mechanisms for a desired outcome with strategic and selfish agents
is an extensively studied problem in economics, with classical work by Myerson
[17], and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves [24], emphasizing truthful mechanisms. The ad-
vent of online interaction and e-commerce has added an efficiency constraint
on the mechanisms, going so far as to prioritize computational efficiency over
classical objectives: e.g. implementing simple approximate mechanisms when op-
timal mechanisms are computationally difficult, or even impossible. Beginning
with Nisan and Ronen [18], the theoretical computer science community has
contributed greatly to the field, in both fundamental problems and specific ap-
plications. In addition to designing truthful mechanisms for the maximization of
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welfare and revenue, this body of work has also focused on learning distributions
of agent types, menu complexity, and dynamic mechanisms (e.g., [5,9].)
We consider this question in the setting of selling computational resources on
remote servers or machines (cf. [23,2].) This is arguably one of the fastest growing
markets on the Internet. The goods (resources) are assigned non-preemptively
and thus have strong complementarities. Furthermore, since the supply (server
capacity) is limited, any mechanism trades immediate revenue for future supply.
Finally, mechanisms must be incentive-compatible, as non-truthful, strategic,
behaviour from the agents can skew the performance of a mechanism from its
theoretical guarantees. This leads us to the following question:
Question. Can we design an efficient, truthful, and revenue-maximizing mech-
anism to sell time-slots non-preemptively on a single server?
We design a posted-price mechanism which maximizes expected revenue up
to additive error, for agents/buyers arriving online, with parameters of value,
length and maximum delay, drawn from an underlying, unknown, distribution.
Three key aspects distinguish our problem from standard online scheduling:
(i) In our setting, as time progresses, the server clears up, allowing longer jobs to
be scheduled in the future if no smaller jobs are scheduled until then. (ii) Schedul-
ing the jobs is not exclusively to the discretion of the mechanism designer, but
must also be desired by the job itself, while also producing sufficient revenue.
(iii) As the mechanism designer, we do not have access to job parameters in an
incentive-compatible way before deciding on a posted price menu. These three
features lie at the core of the difficulty of our problem. Our focus will be on
devising online mechanisms in the Bayesian setting.
In our online model, time on the server is discrete. At every time step, an
agent arrives on the server, with a value V , length requirement L, and maximum
delay D. These parameters are drawn from a common unknown distribution,
i.i.d. across jobs. The job wishes to be scheduled for at least L consecutive time
slots, no more than D time units after its arrival, and wishes to pay no more
than V . Jobs are assumed to have quasi-linear utility in money, and so prefer
the least-price interval within their constraints. The mechanism designer never
learns the parameters of the job. Instead, she posts a price menu of (length,price)
pairs, and the minimum available delay s. The job accepts to be scheduled so
long as D ≥ s, and there is some (length,price) pair in the menu of length at
least L and price at most V . We note that the pricing scheme can be dynamic,
changing through time. If, at time epoch t, an agent chooses option (ℓ, πℓ), then
she pays πℓ and her job will be allocated to the interval [t+ s, t+ s+ ℓ]. She will
choose the option which minimizes πℓ. Throughout this paper we assume that
the random variables L, V,D are discrete, and have finite support.
1.1 Summary of Our Results
1. We model the problem of finding a revenue maximizing pricing strategy as
a Markov Decision Process (MDP). Given a price menu (length,price) and
a state (minimum available delay) s at time t, the probability of transition
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to any other state at time t + 1 is obtained from the distribution of the
job’s parameters. The revenue maximizing pricing strategy can be efficiently
computed via backwards induction. We also present, in appendix C.2, an
approximation scheme in the case where V is a continuous random variable.
2. We prove that the optimal pricing strategy is monotone in length under a
natural distributional assumption, which is slightly weaker than monotone-
hazard-rate / log-concave. This implies the existence of an optimal truthful
pricing mechanism in the finite horizon setting when the distributions are
known. In appendix C.1, this is extended to the infinite discounted horizon
setting, incurring a small additive error.
3. We analyze the performances of the proposed pricing strategy when the
distribution is only known from samples collected through the jobs’ decisions.
We provide a truthful posted price ε-approximate mechanism if the number
of samples is polynomial in 1/ε and the complexity of the distribution.
1.2 Related Work
Much recent work has focused on designing efficient mechanisms for pricing cloud
resources. Chawla et al. [7] recently studied “time-of-use” pricing mechanisms, to
match demand to supply with deadlines and online arrivals. Their result assumes
large-capacity servers, and seeks to maximize welfare. [1] provides a mechanism
for preemptive scheduling with deadlines, maximizing the total value of com-
pleted jobs. Another possible objective for the design of incentive-compatible
scheduling mechanisms is the total value of completed jobs, which have release
times and deadlines. [19] solves this problem in an online setting, while [6],
in the offline setting for parallel machines, and [22], in the online competitive
setting with uncertain supply. [12] focuses on social welfare maximization for
non-preemptive scheduling on multiple servers, and obtains a constant compet-
itive ratio as the number of servers increases. Our work differs from these by
considering stochastic job types, and revenue maximization. [13] addresses com-
puting a price menu for revenue maximization with different machines. Finally,
[2] proposes a system architecture for scheduling and pricing in cloud computing.
Posted price mechanisms (PPM) have been introduced by [21] and have
gained attention due to their simplicity, robustness to collusion, and their ease
of implementation in practice. One of the first theoretical results concerning
PPM’s is an asymptotic comparison to classical single-parameter mechanisms
[4]. They were later studied by [8] for the objective of revenue maximization,
and further strengthened by [14] and [10]. [11] shows that sequential PPM’s can
1/2-approximate social welfare for XOS valuation functions, if the price for an
item is equal to the expected contribution of the item to the social welfare.
Sample complexity for revenue maximization was recently been studied in [9]
showing that a polynomial number of samples is sufficient to obtain near optimal
Bayesian auction mechanisms. An approach based on statistical learning that
allows to learn mechanisms with expected revenue arbitrarily close to optimal
from a polynomial number of samples has been proposed in [15]. The problems
of learning simple auctions from samples has been studied in [16].
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1.3 Structure of the Paper
In §2 we describe the model of the problem as a Markov Decision Process. In §3
we present an efficient algorithm for computing optimal policies for the finite
time horizon. This is extended to other settings in appendix C. In §3.3, we
demonstrate that the optimal policy is monotone, and §4.1 gives the learning
algorithm and error bounds for computing the pricing policies with only (partial)
sample access to the job distribution. In §4.2 we describe the concentration
bounds on the revenue of a pricing policy. Finally, §5 is devoted to describing
and summarizing the final result and future directions of research.
Proof details are provided in appendix B, and the full paper is on arXiv.
2 Model
Notation. In what follows, the variables t, ℓ or L, v or V , and d or D are
reserved for describing the parameters of a job that wishes to be scheduled. Re-
spectively, they represent the arrival time t, required length ℓ, value v, and maxi-
mum allowed delay d. The lowercase variables represent fixed values, whereas the
uppercase represent random variables. Script-uppercase letters L,V ,D represent
the supports of the distributions on L, V , and D, respectively; and the bold-
uppercase letters L,V,D represent the maximum values in these respective sets.
Finally, π is reserved for pricing policy, whereas p is reserved for probabilities.
Single-Machine, Non-Preemptive, Job Scheduling. A sequence of random
jobs wish to be scheduled on a server, non-preemptively, for a sufficiently low
price, within a time constraint. Formally, a job with parameters (L, V,D) arriving
at time t wishes to be scheduled for a price π ≤ V in an interval [a, b] such that
a− t ≤ D and b − a ≥ L. There is an underlying distribution Q over the space
L × V ×D from which we sample the parameters of each new job.
Price Menus. Our goal is to design a take-it-or-leave-it, posted-price mecha-
nism which maximizes expected revenue. At each time period, the mechanism
posts a “price menu” and an earliest-available-time st, indicating that times t
through t+st−1 have already been scheduled. (st will henceforth be referred to
as the state of the server.) We let S := {0, . . . , D+L} to be the set of all possible
states. The state of the server at a given time t is naturally a random variable
which depends on the earlier jobs and on the adopted policy π. As before, we will
denote with s or st the fixed value, and with S or St the corresponding random
variable. The price menu will be given by the function π : [T ]×S×L → R, i.e., if
we are a time t and the server is in state st, then the prices are set according to
πt(st, ·) : L → R. The reported pair (πt(st, ·), st) is computed by the scheduler’s
strategy, which we determine in this paper. Once this is posted, a job (L, V,D)
is then sampled i.i.d. from the underlying distribution Q.
If V ≥ πt(st, ℓ) for some ℓ ≥ L, and D ≥ st, then the job accepts the
schedule, and reports the length ℓ ≥ L which minimize price. Otherwise, the job
reports ℓ = 0 and is not scheduled. To guarantee truthfulness, it suffices to have
πt(s, ·) be monotonically non-decreasing for every state s: the agent would not
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want a longer interval since it costs more, and would not want one of the shorter
intervals since they cannot run the job. Since we are assuming that jobs are
non-preemptive, a false-name strategy for buying multiple small intervals would
expose them to the risk of being assigned a discontinuous interval.
It should be clear that the mechanism’s strategy is to always report mono-
tone non-decreasing prices, as a decrease in the price menu will only cause more
utilization of the server, without accruing more revenue. The main technical chal-
lenge in this paper, then, is to show that under some assumptions, the optimal
strategy is monotone non-decreasing, and efficiently computable.
Revenue Objective. Revenue can be measured in either a finite or an infinite
discounted horizon. In the former (finite) case, only T time periods will occur,
and we seek to maximize the expected sum of revenue over these periods. In the
infinite-horizon setting, future revenue is discounted, at an exponentially decay-
ing rate. Formally, revenue at time t is worth a γt fraction of revenue at time 0,
for some fixed γ < 1. See appendix C.1. Recall that the job parameters are drawn
independently at random from the underlying distribution, so the scheduler can
only base their “price menu” on the state of the system and the current time.
Thus, the only realistic strategy is to fix a state-and-time-dependent pricing
policy π : [T ]× S × L → R, “πt(s, ℓ)”, where [T ] := {0, 1, . . . , T }.
Let X = {X1 := (1, L1, V1, D1), X2 := (2, L2, V2, D2), X3, . . . } be the ran-
dom sequence of jobs arriving, sampled i.i.d. from the underlying distribution.
Let π : [T ] × S × L → R be the pricing policy. We denote as Revt(X , π) the
revenue earned at time t with policy π and sequence X . If Xt does not buy, then
Revt(X , π) = 0, and otherwise, it is equal to πt(st, Lt). We denote as CmlRevT
the total (cumulative) revenue earned over the T periods. Thus,
CmlRevT (X , π) :=
∑T
t=0 Revt(X , π). (1)
We will also need the expected-future-revenue, given a current time and server
state, which we will denote as follows:
Uπt (s) = EX≥t
[∑T
i=t Revi(π,X )
∣∣∣St = s] , (2)
The subscript of the expectation X≥t denotes that we consider only jobs arriving
from time t onward. Our objective is to find the pricing policy π which maximizes
Uπ0 (s = 0). Call this π
∗, and denote the expected revenue under π∗ as U∗t (·).
3 Bayes-optimal Strategies for Sever Pricing
In this section we seek to compute an optimal monotone pricing policy π :
[T ]× S × L → R which maximizes revenue in expectation over T jobs sampled
i.i.d. from an underlying known distribution Q. This is extended to the infinite-
horizon, discounted, setting in appendix C.1.
We first model the problem of maximizing the revenue in online server pricing
as a Markov Decision Process that admits an efficiently-computable, optimal
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pricing strategy. The main contribution of this section is to show that, for a
natural assumption on the distribution Q, the optimal policy is monotone. We
recall that this allows us to derive truthful Bayes-optimal mechanisms.
3.1 Markov Decision Processes.
We show that the theory of Markov Decision Processes is well suited to model
our problem. A Markov Decision Process is, in its essence, a Markov Chain
whose transition probabilities depend on the action chosen at each state, and
where to each transition is assigned a reward. A policy is then a function π
mapping states to actions. In our setting, the states are the states of the system
outlined in Section 2 (i.e., the possible delays before the earliest available time
on the server), and the actions are the “price menus.” At every state s, a job of a
random length arrives, and with some probability, chooses to be scheduled, given
the choice of prices. The next state is either max{s − 1, 0}, if the job does not
choose to be scheduled (since we have moved forward in time), or s+ ℓ− 1, if a
job of length ℓ is scheduled, since we have occupied ℓ more units. The transition
probabilities depend on the distribution of job lengths, and the probability that
a job accepts to be scheduled given the pricing policy (action). Formally,
Pr[st+1 = st + ℓ − 1] =
{
Pr [Lt = ℓ, Vt ≥ πt(st, ℓ), Dt ≥ st + ℓ] if ℓ ≥ 1
1−
∑
k≥0 Pr[st+1 = st + k] if ℓ = 0
(3)
(Transitions to state “−1” should be read as transitions to state “ 0”.) Note that
a job of length ℓ may choose to purchase an interval of length greater than ℓ,
which would render these transition probabilities incorrect. However, this may
only happen if the larger interval is more affordable. It is therefore in the sched-
uler’s interest to guarantee that πt(s, ·) in monotone non-decreasing in ℓ, which
incentivizes truthfulness, since this increases the amount of server-time available,
without affecting revenue. Thus we restrict ourselves to this case.
It remains to define the transition rewards. They are simply the revenue
earned. Formally, a transition from state st to st+ℓ−1 incurs a reward of πt(s, ℓ),
whereas a transition from state st to st−1 incurs 0 reward. We wish to compute
a policy π in such a way as to maximize the expected cumulative revenue, given
as the (possibly discounted) sum of all transition rewards in expectation.
3.2 Solving for the Optimal Policy with Distributional Knowledge
In this section, we present a modified MDP whose optimal policies can be effi-
ciently computed, and show that these policies are optimal for the original MDP.
In this section, we assume that the mechanism designer is given access to the
underlying distribution Q. This is not in line with our model, since we assume
the contrary. However, in the following sections, we will show that if the distri-
bution Q is estimated from samples, then solving for the MDP on this estimated
distribution is sufficient to ensure sufficiently good revenue guarantees.
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Since the problem has been modelled as a Markov Decision Process (MDP),
we may rely on the wealth of literature available on MDP solutions, in particular
we will leverage the backwards induction algorithm (BIA) of [20]§4.5, included in
appendix B as Algorithm 1. We will however need to ensure that this standard
algorithm (i) runs efficiently, and (ii) returns a monotone pricing policy.
Note that past prices do not contribute to future revenue insofar as the
current state remains unchanged. Thus, to compute optimal current prices, we
need only know the current state and expected future revenue. This allows us
to use the BIA. The idea is to compute the optimal time-dependent policy, and
the incurred expected reward, for shorter horizons, then use this to recursively
compute the optimal policies for longer horizons.
The total runtime of the BIA is O(T |S||A|). Note that the dependence on
T is unavoidable, since any optimal policy must be time-dependent. Recall that
L and D denote the maximum values that L and D can take, respectively, and
V is the set of possible values that V can take. Denote K := max{D + L, |V|}.
If we define the action space na¨ıvely, we have |S| = D+ L ≤ K, and |A| ≤ KL.
Thus, a na¨ıve definition of the MDP bounds the runtime at KO(K), which is far
from efficient. Requiring monotonocity only affects lower-order terms.
Modified MDP. To avoid this exponential dependence, we can be a little
clever about the definition of the state space: instead of states being the possible
server states, we define our state space as possible (state, length) pairs. Thus,
when the MDP is in state (s, ℓ), the server is in state s, and a job of length
ℓ has been sampled from the distribution. Our action-space then is simply the
possible values of πt(s, ℓ), and the transition probabilities and rewards become:
Pr[(s, ℓ)→ (s′, ℓ′)|π] =

Pr[V ≥ πt(s, ℓ), D ≥ s|L = ℓ] Pr[L
′ = ℓ′] if s′ = s+ ℓ− 1
Pr[V < πt(s, ℓ) or D < s|L = ℓ] Pr[L
′ = ℓ′] if s′ = s− 1
0 otherwise
(4)
R((s, ℓ)→ (s′, ℓ′)|π) =
{
πt(s, ℓ) if s
′ = s+ ℓ− 1
0 otherwise
(5)
Therefore, we get |S| = (D+L) ·L ≤ K2, and |A| ≤ K. Thus, the runtime of
the algorithm becomes O(TK3). A full description of the procedure is given in
appendix B as Algorithm 2. It remains to prove that it is correct. We begin by
claiming that these two MDPs are equivalent in the following sense:
Lemma 1. For any fixed pricing policy π : [T ]× S × L → R,
Uπt (s) = EL [u
π
t (s, L)] , ∀t ∈ T, s ∈ S,
where the Uπt (·)’s are as in (2), and the u
π
t (·, ·)’s are from the modified MDP.
(See appendix B for a proof.) This lemma, however, does not suffice on its own,
as agents may behave strategically by over-reporting their length, if the prices
are not increasing. This would alter the transition probabilities, breaking the
analysis. We will see that under a mild assumption, this can not happen, as the
optimal policy for non-strategic agents will be monotone, and therefore truthful.
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3.3 Monotonicity of the Optimal Pricing Policies
Recall that the solution of the more efficient MDP formulation is only correct
if we can show that it is always monotone without considering the strategic
behaviour of agents, ensuring incentive-compatibility of the optimal.
An optimal monotone strategy cannot be obtained for all the distributions
on L, V, and D. As an example, for any distribution where a job’s value is a
deterministic function of their length, the optimal policy is to price-discriminate
by length. If this function is not monotone, the optimum won’t be either. We
wish to show monotonicity under the assumption below.
Assumption 1. The quantity Pr[V≥µ
′,D≥s|L=ℓ]
Pr[V≥µ,D≥s|L=ℓ] is monotone non-decreasing as
ℓ grows, for any state s and 0 ≤ µ < µ′ fixed.
This is not an immediately intuitive assumption, but we show that it is satis-
fied by all “ℓ-parametrized” log-concave random variables, where the parametriza-
tion captures a sense of positive correlation between length and value. Recall that
log-concave random variables are exactly those which havemonotone hazard rate.
Lemma 2. Let, V sℓ denote the marginal random variable V conditioned on L =
ℓ and D ≥ s. Let Z be a continuously-supported random variable, and γs1 ≤ γ
s
2 ≤
· · · ∈ R. If V sℓ is distributed like γ
s
ℓ · Z, ⌊γ
s
ℓ · Z⌋, Z + γ
s
ℓ , or ⌊Z + γ
s
ℓ ⌋, then the
assumption is satisfied if Z is log-concave, or if the γ’s are independent of ℓ.
A discussion of log-concave random variables and a proof of this fact is given in
appendix A. Many standard (discrete) distributions are (discrete) log-concave
random variables, including the uniform, Gaussian, logistic, exponential, Pois-
son, binomial, etc. These can be proved to be log-concave from the discussion in
appendix A. In the above, the γ terms represent a notion of spread or shifting,
parametrized by the length, indicating some amount of positive correlation.
It remains to show price monotonicity under the above assumption. First, we
begin with the following, which holds for arbitrary distributions.
Lemma 3. Let U∗t (s) be the expected future revenue earned starting at time t
in state s, for the optimal policy computed by Algorithm 2. Then the function
s 7→ U∗t (s) is monotone non-increasing in s for any t fixed.
See appendix B for the proof. This lemma ensures that over-selling time on the
server can only hurt the mechanism. This allows us to conclude
Lemma 4. If the distribution on job parameters satisfies the above assumption,
then for all ℓ, s, t, we have π∗t (s, ℓ) ≤ π
∗
t (s, ℓ+ 1).
Proof (Sketch.). As usual, a full proof may be found in appendix B. The idea
is to show that, for any price µ less than the optimum π∗t (s, ℓ), the difference
in revenue between charging µ and π∗t (s, ℓ) to jobs of length ℓ is less than the
difference in revenue between the same prices for jobs of length ℓ + 1. This is
achieved by applying the assumption to recursive definition of future revnue,
along with the previous lemma. Thus, we can conclude that the optimal price
π∗t (s, ℓ+ 1) must be greater than π
∗
t (s, ℓ). ⊓⊔
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With Lemma 4 and the results of Appendix C, we finally have:
Theorem 1. The online server pricing problem admits an optimal monotone
pricing strategy when the variables L, V , and D satisfy assumption 1. Also,
1. In the finite horizon setting, when V is finitely supported, an exact optimum
can be computed in time O(TK3).
2. In the infinite horizon setting, when V is finitely supported, for all ε > 0, an
ε-additive-approximate policy can be computed in time
O
(
K
3 logγ
(
ε(1−γ)
V
))
≤ O
(
K
3
1−γ ln
(
V
ε(1−γ)
))
3. In the finite horizon setting, when V is continuously supported, for all η > 0,
an ηT -additive-approximate policy can be computed in time O(TK2V/η).
4 Performance with distribution learned from samples
In the previous section, we have shown how to compute the optimal pricing policy
in expectation, given the distribution. However, our problem does not allow
access to this distribution. We describe here how one might learn a distribution
Qˆ which approximates Q in our setting. We then show that the Bayes-optimal
policy computed over Qˆ performs well in expectation and with high probability.
4.1 Learning the Underlying Distribution from Samples
When a job arrives, we only learn its length, and only if it agrees to be scheduled.
Thus, we are not given full samples of Q, complicating the learning procedure.
We propose here a simple sampling method allowed within the model, which
efficiently computes an estimated Qˆ with good error bounds. This in turn lets
us to bound the error on the estimated future revenues, and to show that the
revenue of any given policy with jobs from Q is similar to the revenue for this
same policy with jobs from Qˆ. Thus, a policy which is optimal with respect to
Qˆ will be close-to-optimal with respect to Q.
Let X = {(L1, V1, D1), . . . , (Ln, Vn, Dn), } be an i.i.d. sample of n jobs from
the underlying distribution Q. Note that the expectation of an indicator is the
probability of the indicated event. Fix a length ℓ, a state s, and a value v. As a
consequence of Ho¨ffding’s inequality, with probability 1− δ,∣∣∣ 1n ∑nk=1 I[Lk = ℓ, Vk ≥ v,Dk ≥ s]− Pr[L = ℓ, V ≥ v,D ≥ s]∣∣∣ ≤
√
log(2/δ)
2n (6)
Sampling Procedure. We wish to estimate the value Pr[L = ℓ, V ≥ v,D ≥ s]
for all choices of ℓ, v, and s. Fixing v and s, we may repeatedly post prices
πt(s, ℓ) = v and declare that the earliest available time is s, then record (i) which
job accepts to be scheduled, and (ii) the length of each scheduled job. Let ε > 0
and n ≥ log(2/δ)/(2ε2), then by (6), the sample-average of each value will have
error at most ε with probability 1− δ, for any one choice of (ℓ, v, s).
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Repeating this process for all ≤ K2 choices of v ∈ V and s ∈ S gives us
estimates for each. Now, if we want to have the estimate hold over all choices
of ℓ, v, s, it suffices to take the union bound over all ≤ K3 values (incl. ℓ), and
scaling accordingly. If we take n ≥ 3 log(2K/δ)/(2ε2) samples for each of the
≤ K2 choices of v and s, then simultaneously for all ℓ, v, and s, the quantity
in (6) is at most ε. In an abuse of notation, we will denote this “|Q− Qˆ| < ε”.
It should be noted that, for this sampling procedure, if a job of length ℓ is
scheduled, we must possibly wait at most ℓ times units before taking the next
sample to clear the buffer. This blows up the sampling time by a factor of O(L).
Later, we will need to estimate the value Pr[L = ℓ,¬(V ≥ v,D ≥ s)], that
is the probability that the job has length ℓ, but either cannot afford price v, or
cannot be scheduled s slots in the future. This is equal to
Pr[L = ℓ]− Pr[L = ℓ, V ≥ v,D ≥ s] .
The left-hand term is equal to Pr[L = ℓ,V ≥ 0,D ≥ 0], and so we have access to
both terms. The estimation error is additive, so the deviation is at most 2ε.
Denote pℓt,s := Pr[V ≥ π
t(s, ℓ), D ≥ s|L = ℓ], and recall
Uπt (s) :=
∑
ℓ∈L
Pr[L = ℓ]
(
pℓt,s
(
πt(s, ℓ)+U
π
t+1(s+ ℓ− 1)
)
+(1−pℓt,s)U
π
t+1(s− 1)
)
,
(7)
the expected revenue from time t onwards, conditioning on St = s. Let Uˆ
π
t (·) be
the same as Uπt (·), but where the variables are distributed as Qˆ. As before, let
U∗t (·) be U
π
t (·) for π = π
∗, the Bayes-optimal policy returned by Algorithm 2,
and Uˆ∗t (·) defined similarly but with respect to Qˆ. We will show that Uˆ
∗
t (·) is a
good estimate for U∗t (·).
Lemma 5. Let n, Q, and Qˆ, be as above. In the finite horizon, for all ε > 0, if
n ≥ 6TK4 log(2K/δ)/ε2, we have that with probability 1− δ, |U∗t (s)− Uˆ
∗
t (s)| < ε
for all t, s. In the infinite horizon, if n ≥ 6K4 log(2K/δ)/((1 − γ)ε2), we have
that with probability 1− δ, |U∗(s)− Uˆ∗(s)| < ε for all s.
As usual, the proof is in Appendix B.3. It is a consequence of |Q − Qˆ| being
small, which is a consequence of Ho¨ffding’s inequality for the right choice of n.
4.2 Concentration Bounds on Revenue for Online Scheduling
In the previous section, we showed that the performance of any fixed policy,
including π∗, can be well estimated given sufficient samples from Q. In this
section, we show that the revenue of arbitrary policies concentrates around their
mean. This will allow us to argue later that, if we first learn Q from samples, then
execute Algorithm 2 given the sample distribution Qˆ, then the output policy will
perform well with respect to Q, both in expectation, and with high probability.
To show this concentration, we will consider the Doob or exposure martingale
of the cumulative revenue function, introduced in Section 2. Define
Rπi := E [CmlRevT (π,X )|X1, . . . , Xi] (8)
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where the Xi’s are jobs in the sequence X and the expected value is taken
with respect to Xi+1, . . .XT . Thus, R
π
0 is the expected cumulative revenue, and
RπT is the random cumulative revenue. To formally describe this martingale se-
quence, we will introduce some notation, and formalize some previous notation.
Recall that X1, X2, . . . is a sequence of jobs sampled i.i.d. from an underlying
distribution Q. Fix a pricing policy π : [T ]× S × L → R. Note that the state
at time t is a random variable depending on both the (deterministic) pricing
policy and the (random) X1, . . . ,Xt−1. We denote it St(π,X ), or St for short.
Formally, suppose Xt = (Vt, Lt, Dt), then St+1(π,X ) = St(π,X ) − 1 if either
Vt < πt(St, Lt) or Dt < St, and otherwise St+1(π,X ) = St(π,X ) + Lt − 1.
Furthermore, let Revt(π,X ) be equal to 0 in the first case above (the t-th job
is not scheduled), and πt(St, Lt) otherwise. Thus, St(π,X ) and Revt(π,X ) are
functions of the random values X1, . . . , Xt for π fixed. Note that Revt implicitly
depends on St. Let X>i := (Xi+1,Xi+2, . . .) and X≤i := (X1, . . .Xi). Recalling
that CmlRevT (X , π) =
∑T
t=1 Revt(X , π), we have
Rπi =
i∑
t=0
Revt(π,X ) + EX>i
[∑T
t=i+1 Revt(π,X )
∣∣∣ Si+1(π,X≤i)] (9a)
=
(∑i
t=0 Revt(π,X≤t)
)
+ Uπi+1(Si+1(π,X≤i)) (9b)
We wish to show that CmlRev(X , π) concentrates around its mean. Since Rπ0
is the expected revenue due to π, and RπT is the (random) revenue observed,
it suffices to show |Rπ0 − R
π
T | is small, which we will do by applying Azuma’s
inequality, after showing the bounded-differences property. This gives
Theorem 2. Let X be a finite sequence of T jobs sampled i.i.d. from Q, and let
π be any monotone policy. Then, with probability 1− δ,
|CmlRevT (X , π) − EX ′ [CmlRevT (X
′, π)]| ≤ V ·
√
2 log(2/δ)T .
in the finite horizon, and in the infinite-horizon-discounted,
|CmlRev∞(X , π) − EX ′ [CmlRevT (X
′, π)]| ≤ V ·
√
2 log(2/δ)/(1− γ2).
4.3 Performance of the Computed Policy
We combine here the results of the two previous subsections to analyze the
performance of the policy output by Alg. 2. By the estimation of revenue, the best
policy in estimated-expectation is near-optimal in expectation. Since revenues
from arbitrary policies concentrate, we get near-optimal revenue in hindsight.
Formally, for ε > 0, Lemma 5 gives us that if the sample-distribution Qˆ is
computed on n ≥ 6TK4 log(2K/δ)/ε2 samples, then with probability 1− δ over
the samples, |U∗t (s)− Uˆ
∗
t (s)| ≤ ε. Note that U
∗
t=0(s = 0) is exactly the expected
cumulative revenue of the optimal policy. For clarity of notation, denote
ECRevT (π|Q) := EX∼Q [CmlRevT (X , π)] (10)
We have shown that for sufficient samples, |ECRevT (π
∗|Q)−ECRevT (π
∗|Qˆ)| < ε,
with probability 1− δ. This observation allows us to then conclude
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Theorem 3. Let Q be the underlying distribution of jobs, let ε > 0 and n ≥
24TK4 log(8K/δ)/ε2, and let Qˆ be the sampled distribution as in section 4.1,
learned from n samples. Let πˆ be the Qˆ-optimal policy returned by Algorithm 2
given Qˆ. Then with probability (1− δ), for any arbitrary policy π,
CmlRevT (X , πˆ) ≥ CmlRevT (X , π) − 2V
√
2 log(8/δ)(T + 1)− ε .
In the infinite horizon, the error term is 2V
√
2 log(8/δ)/(1− γ2)− ε and needs
n ≥ 24K4 log(8K/δ)/((1− γ)ε2) samples.
Proof. We have chosen n ≥ 6TK4 log(2K/(δ/4))/(ε/2)2. Let π∗ be the optimal
policy for the true distribution Q. By Theorem 2, we have |CmlRevT (X , π) −
ECRevT (π|Q)| < V
√
2 log(8/δ)(T + 1) with probability 1 − δ/4 for both π and
πˆ. Furthermore, by Lemma 5, |ECRevT (π|Q)− ECRevT (π|Qˆ)| < ε/2 with prob-
ability 1 − δ/4, for both π = πˆ and π∗. This is because from the point of view
of πˆ, Qˆ is the true distribution, and Q is the estimate. Taking the union bound
over all four events above, and recalling that πˆ maximizes ECRevT (π|Qˆ), and π
∗
maximizes ECRevT (π|Q), we get the following with probability 1− δ:
CmlRevT (X , πˆ) ≥ ECRevT (πˆ|Q)− V
√
2 log(8/δ)(T + 1) (concentration)
≥ ECRevT (πˆ|Qˆ)− V
√
2 log(8/δ)(T + 1)− ε/2 (sample error)
≥ ECRevT (π
∗|Qˆ)− V
√
2 log(8/δ)(T + 1)− ε/2 (optimality)
≥ ECRevT (π
∗|Q)− V
√
2 log(8/δ)(T + 1)− ε (sample error)
≥ ECRevT (π|Q)− V
√
2 log(8/δ)(T + 1)− ε (optimality)
≥ CmlRevT (X , π)− 2V
√
2 log(8/δ)(T + 1)− ε (concentration)
as desired. The proof for infinite-horizon is identical. ⊓⊔
5 Conclusions
In summary, we propose to price time on a server by first learning the distribution
over jobs from samples, then computing the Bayes-optimal policy from the esti-
mated distribution. Our learning algorithm is simple: we sample the distribution
through the observation of n jobs at artificially fixed prices and server-states,
and learn the job parameters depending on whether they accept to be sched-
uled. Using these observations, we build an observed distribution Qˆ. We then
run Algorithm 2 with Qˆ and compute an optimal policy πˆ for Qˆ. We are guar-
anteed that the policy prices monotonically (due to Lemma 3), and therefore it
is incentive compatible, which implies the correctness of the estimated revenue.
We conclude with the following theorem that combines the results of Theo-
rems 1, 2, and 3, when the policy π is the optimal policy π∗. Recall that we have
made the distribution assumption from Section 3.3.
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Theorem 4 (Finite Horizon). Let Q be the underlying distribution over jobs.
Let ε > 0, and n ≥ 24TK4 log(8K/δ)/ε2. Then in time O(TK3 + nL), we may
compute a policy πˆ which is monotone in length, and therefore incentive com-
patible, such that for any policy π, with probability (1− δ),
CmlRevT (X , πˆ) ≥ CmlRevT (X , π) − 2V
√
2 log(8/δ)(T + 1)− ε
Furthermore, if the distribution over values V is continuous rather than discrete,
we may compute in time O(TK2V/η + nL) a monotone policy πˆ such that for
any policy π, with probability 1− δ,
CmlRevT (X , πˆ) ≥ CmlRevT (X , π)− 2V
√
2 log(8/δ)(T + 1)− ε− ηT
This policy πˆ is computed by learning Qˆ from samples as in Section 4.1, and
running Algorithm 2 for the estimated distribution. When V is continuously
distributed, choose prices which are multiples of η between 0 and V, as is outlined
in appendix C.2.
Theorem 5 (Infinite Horizon, Discounted). Let Q be the underlying dis-
tribution over jobs. Let ε > 0, and n ≥ 24K4 log(8K/δ)ε2(1−γ) . Then we may compute a
policy πˆ in time O
(
K
3
1−γ ln
(
V
ε(1−γ)
)
+ nL
)
, which is monotone, and thus incen-
tive compatible, such that for any policy π, with probability (1 − δ),
CmlRev∞(X , πˆ) ≥ CmlRev∞(X , π)− 2V
√
2 log(8/δ)/(1− γ2)− 2ε
Furthermore, if the distribution over values V is continuous rather than discrete,
we may compute in time O
(
K
2
V/η
1−γ ln
(
V
ε(1−γ)
)
+ nL
)
a monotone policy πˆ such
that for any π, with probability 1− δ,
CmlRev∞(X , πˆ) ≥ CmlRev∞(X , π) − 2V
√
2 log(8/δ)/(1− γ2)− 2ε− η/(1− γ)
As above, this policy πˆ is computed by learning Qˆ from n samples as in Sec-
tion 4.1, then running the modified Algorithm 2 for the estimated distribution.
In case V is continuously distributed, we restrict ourselves to prices which are
multiples of η between 0 and V.
Future Work. There are many natural extensions to this work. For example,
one could consider a multi-server setting, settings where jobs can request to
be scheduled later than the earliest available time, or settings where jobs need
various quantities of differing resources, such as memory and computation time.
References
1. Azar, Y., Kalp-Shaltiel, I., Lucier, B., Menache, I., Naor, J., Yaniv, J.: Truthful
online scheduling with commitments. In: EC (2015)
14 S. Boodaghians et al.
2. Babaioff, M., Mansour, Y., Nisan, N., Noti, G., Curino, C., Ganapathy, N., Men-
ache, I., Reingold, O., Tennenholtz, M., Timnat, E.: Era: A framework for economic
resource allocation for the cloud. In: Proceedings of the 26th WWW Companion.
pp. 635–642 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1145/3041021.3054186
3. Bagnoli, M., Bergstrom, T.: Log-concave probability and its applications. Economic
theory 26(2), 445–469 (2005)
4. Blumrosen, L., Holenstein, T.: Posted prices vs. negotiations: an asymptotic anal-
ysis. In: Proceedings of the 9th EC. pp. 49–49. ACM (2008)
5. den Boer, A.V.: Dynamic pricing and learning: historical origins, current research,
and new directions. Surveys in O.R. and management science 20(1), 1–18 (2015)
6. Carroll, T.E., Grosu, D.: An incentive-compatible mechanism for scheduling non-
malleable parallel jobs with individual deadlines. In: Proceedings of the 2008 ICPP.
pp. 107–114 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1109/ICPP.2008.27
7. Chawla, S., Devanur, N.R., Holroyd, A.E., Karlin, A.R., Martin, J.B., Sivan, B.:
Stability of service under time-of-use pricing. In: Procs. of the 49th Annual ACM
SIGACT Symp. on Theory of Computing. pp. 184–197. ACM (2017)
8. Chawla, S., Hartline, J.D., Malec, D.L., Sivan, B.: Multi-parameter mechanism
design and sequential posted pricing. In: Proc’s of the 42nd STOC. ACM (2010)
9. Cole, R., Roughgarden, T.: The sample complexity of revenue maximization. In:
Proceedings of the 46th STOC. pp. 243–252. ACM (2014)
10. Du¨tting, P., Kleinberg, R.: Polymatroid prophet inequalities. In: Proceedings of
the 23rd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA). pp. 437–449 (2015)
11. Feldman, M., Gravin, N., Lucier, B.: Combinatorial auctions via posted prices. In:
Proceedings of the 26th SODA. pp. 123–135. ACM-SIAM (2015)
12. Jain, N., Menache, I., Naor, J., Yaniv, J.: A truthful mechanism for value-based
scheduling in cloud computing. Theory of Computing Systems 54, 388–406 (2013)
13. Kilcioglu, C., Rao, J.M.: Competition on price and quality in cloud computing. In:
WWW (2016)
14. Kleinberg, R., Weinberg, S.M.: Matroid prophet inequalities. In: Proceedings of
the 44th STOC. pp. 123–136. ACM (2012)
15. Morgenstern, J., Roughgarden, T.: The pseudo-dimension of near-optimal auctions.
In: Proceedings of the 28th NeurIPS. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, USA (2015)
16. Morgenstern, J., Roughgarden, T.: Learning simple auctions. In: 29th COLT. Pro-
ceedings of Machine Learning Research, vol. 49, pp. 1298–1318 (2016)
17. Myerson, R.B.: Optimal auction design. Math’s. of O.R. 6(1), 58–73 (1981)
18. Nisan, N., Ronen, A.: Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract). In: Pro-
ceedings of the 31st STOC. pp. 129–140. ACM (1999)
19. Porter, R.: Mechanism design for online real-time scheduling. In: Proc’s. of the 5th
EC. pp. 61–70. EC ’04, ACM (2004). https://doi.org/10.1145/988772.988783
20. Puterman, M.L.: Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Pro-
gramming (Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics). Wiley-Interscience (2005)
21. Sandholm, T., Gilpin, A.: Sequences of Take-It-or-Leave-It Offers: Near-Optimal
Auctions Without Full Valuation Revelation, pp. 73–91. Springer (2004)
22. Stro¨hle, P., Gerding, E.H., de Weerdt, M., Stein, S., Robu, V.: Online mechanism
design for scheduling non-preemptive jobs under uncertain supply and demand. In:
Int’l. conference on AAMAS 2014. pp. 437–444 (2014)
23. Tang, X., Li, X., Fu, Z.: Budget-constraint stochastic task sched. on heterogeneous
cloud systems. Concurrency and Comp.: Practice and Experience 29(19) (2017)
24. Vickrey, W.: Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. The
Journal of Finance 16(1), 8–37 (1961)
Online Revenue Maximization for Server Pricing 15
A Log-Concave Distributions
In Section 3.3, we sought to show that if the value of a random job has a log-
concave distribution, then the optimal policy will be monotone. We present here
a discussion of log-concavity, both for continuous and discrete random variables,
and give the proof of the monotonicity of the prices.
Formally, a function f : R → R is log-concave if for any x and y, and for
any 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, lg f(θx + (1 − θ)y) ≥ θ lg f(x) + (1 − θ) lg f(y). Equivalently,
f(θx + (1 − θ)y) ≥ f(x)θf(y)1−θ. For a discretely supported f : Z → R, we
replace this condition with f(x)2 ≥ f(x− 1)f(x+ 1), emulating the continuous
definition with θ = 12 . We further require that the support of f be “connected”.
Definition 1. A continuous random variable X with density function f is said
to be log-concave if f is log-concave. A discrete random variable Y with proba-
bility mass function p is said to be log-concave if p is discretely log-concave.
A well-known fact is that log-concave random variables also have log-concave
cumulative density/mass functions. We present here a quick proof of this fact,
for completeness.
Claim. If X is a log-concave continuous r.v., then Pr[X ≤ x], and Pr[X ≥ x] are
log-concave functions of x. If Y is a log-concave discrete r.v. supported on N,
then Pr[Y ≤ y] and Pr[Y ≥ y] are discretely log-concave functions of y.
Proof. The continuous case is well-documented in the literature. See for exam-
ple [3]. For the discrete case, observe first that since a mass function is non-
negative, and we have assumed contiguous support, the function must be single-
peaked, i.e. quasi-concave, as any local minimum would contradict the definition.
Furthermore, the definition of log-concavity is equivalent to
py
py−1
≥
py+1
py
. Re-
peatedly applying this, and rearranging, we get
pypy+k ≥ py−1py+k+1 ∀y, k ∈ Z, k ≥ 0 .
It remains to show that P (y) :=
∑y
−∞ pk is log-concave. We have
P (y)P (y) = P (y − 1)P (y) +
y∑
−∞
pkpy
≥ P (y − 1)P (y) +
y∑
−∞
pk−1py+1 = P (y − 1)P (y + 1)
as desired. The same technique applies for the upper-sum. ⊓⊔
This will allow us to then conclude:
(Lemma 2, p.8) Let, V sℓ denote the marginal r.v. V conditioned on L = ℓ and
D ≥ s. Let Z be a continuously-supported random variable, and γs1 ≤ γ
s
2 ≤ · · · ∈
R. If V sℓ is distributed like γ
s
ℓ ·Z, ⌊γ
s
ℓ · Z⌋, Z+γ
s
ℓ , or ⌊Z + γ
s
ℓ ⌋, then assumption
1 is satisfied if Z is log-concave, or if the γ’s are independent of ℓ.
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Proof. First, observe that
Pr[V ≥ µ,D ≥ s|L = ℓ] = Pr[V ≥ µ|D ≥ s, L = ℓ] · Pr[D ≥ s|L = ℓ] .
and since we are taking ratios for s fixed, we can replace the joint cumulatives
on V and D in the assumption, with the marginals on just V .
Now, if the γ’s are independent of ℓ, then the ratio remains unchanged as ℓ
changes, satisfying assumption 1. Otherwise, we begin by analyzing the dis-
tributions given by γsℓZ and Z + γ
s
ℓ . Let F¯ (x) := Pr[Z ≥ x], noting that
Pr[V sℓ ≥ µ] = F¯ (µ/γ
s
ℓ ) and F¯ (µ − γ
s
ℓ ), for the two cases, respectively. Note
that we wish to show Pr[V sℓ ≥ µ
′]/Pr[V sℓ ≥ µ] is increasing, which is equivalent
to log(Pr[V sℓ ≥ µ
′])− log(Pr[V sℓ ≥ µ]) increasing.
For V sℓ ∼ Z + γ
s
ℓ , observe that for x
′ > x and γ′ > γ, we have
log F¯ (x − γ)− log F¯ (x′ − γ) ≥ log F¯ (x− γ′)− log F¯ (x′ − γ′)
since log F¯ is a non-increasing and concave function, by assumption. Also
log F¯ (x/γ)− log F¯ (x′/γ) ≥ log F¯ (x/γ′)− log F¯ (x/γ′ + (x′ − x)/γ)
≥ log F¯ (x/γ′)− log F¯ (x′/γ′)
where the first inequality is the same as the previous equation, as the second is
by monotonicity. Thus we have done the continuous case.
For V sℓ ∼ ⌊Z + γ
s
ℓ ⌋, we note that ⌊Z + γ⌋ ≥ x if Z + γ ≥ ⌈x⌉. So the
probability is F¯ (⌈x⌉−γ). Similarly, for V sℓ ∼ ⌊γ
s
ℓ · Z⌋, Pr ⌊γZ⌋ ≥ x is F¯ (⌈x⌉ /γ).
Thus, if we assume that x and x′ are integers, the calculations above go through,
as desired. ⊓⊔
We present a final fact that justifies the use of ⌊Z⌋-type random variables:
Lemma 6. If Y is a discrete log-concave random variable, then there exists a
continuous log-concave Z such that Y ∼ ⌊Z⌋.
Proof. Let P : Z → [0, 1] be the right-hand cumulative mass function for Y .
Then, it suffices to have Pr[Z ≥ n] = P (n) for all integers n. Let φ : R → R
be the piecewise-linear function such that φ(−∞) → 0, φ(∞) → −∞, and
φ(n) = log(P (n)) for all n. Since log(P ) is a discretely concave and non-
increasing function, φ must be concave and non-increasing. We can then set
Z to be the random variable whose density is given by − ddx exp(φ(x)). ⊓⊔
B Detailed Proofs
We present in this section the detailed proofs of the lemmas and theorems from
the text. B.1 gives the pseudocode for the dynamic programs that comptue
the optimal pricing policies, outlined in Section 3, B.2 gives the proofs for the
monotonicity of the pricing policies, along with the discussion on log-concave
random variables from Appendix A, and B.3 gives the computations of the error
bounds from Section 4.
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B.1 MDP Algorithms and Correctness
ALGORITHM 1: Backwards Induction for Finite-Horizon MDP’s [20], section 4.5
Data: MDP with states S , actions A, and rewards R; and a horizon T .
Result: Optimal policy π∗ : [T ]× S → A.
begin
Initialize U∗T (s)← 0 for all s ∈ S .
for t from T − 1 to 0, descending do
for s ∈ S do
U∗t (s)← maxa∈A
{∑
s′∈S
Pr[st+1 = s
′|s, a]
(
Reward(s→ s′|a)+U∗t+1(s
′)
)}
π∗(t, s)← argmaxa∈A
{∑
s′∈S
Pr[st+1 = s
′|s, a]
(
Reward(s→
s′|a) + U∗t+1(s
′)
)}
return π
ALGORITHM 2: Optimal policy in finite horizon
Data: Distribution Q, L, V, S and horizon T .
Result: Optimal policy π∗ : [T ]× S × L→R.
Initialize U∗T (s)← 0 for all s ∈ S , and u
∗
T (s, ℓ)← 0 for all s ∈ S , ℓ ∈ L.
for t from T − 1 to 0, descending do
for s ∈ S do
for ℓ ∈ L do
u∗t (s, ℓ)← maxµ∈V
{
Pr[V ≥ µ,D ≥ s|L = ℓ] ×
(
µ+ U∗t+1(s+ ℓ− 1)− U
∗
t+1(s− 1)
)
+ U∗t+1(s− 1)
}
π∗t (s, ℓ)← argmaxµ∈V
{
Pr[V ≥ µ,D ≥ s|L = ℓ] ×
(
µ+ U∗t+1(s+ ℓ− 1) − U
∗
t+1(s− 1)
)
+ U∗t+1(s− 1)
}
U∗t (s)←
∑
ℓ∈L
Pr[L = ℓ]u∗t (s, ℓ).
return π∗
(Lemma 1, p.7) For any fixed pricing policy π : [T ]× S × L → R,
Uπt (s) = EL [u
π
t (s, L)] , ∀t ∈ T, s ∈ S,
where the Uπt (·)’s are as in (2), and the u
π
t (·, ·)’s are from the modified MDP.
Proof. The statement is true for t = T since in that case everything is zero.
Suppose EL′
[
uπt+1(s, L
′)
]
= Uπt+1(s) for all s. For the fixed policy π, we define
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pℓt,s := Pr[V ≥ πt(s, ℓ), D ≥ s|L = ℓ]. Then,
EL [u
π
t (s, L)] =
∑
ℓ∈L
Pr[L = ℓ]uπt (s, ℓ)
=
∑
ℓ∈L
Pr[L = ℓ]
(
πt(s, ℓ)p
ℓ
t,s + p
ℓ
t,s EL′
[
uπt+1(s+ ℓ− 1, L
′)
]
+ (1 − pℓt,s)EL′
[
uπt+1(s− 1, L
′)
] )
=
∑
ℓ∈L
Pr[L = ℓ]
(
πt(s, ℓ)p
ℓ
t,s + p
ℓ
t,su
π
t+1(s+ ℓ − 1, L
′)
+ (1 − pℓt,s)u
π
t+1(s− 1, L
′)
)
= EX
[
Revt(π,X ) + U
π
t+1(St+1(St,X )) |St = s
]
=: Uπt (s) 
B.2 Monotonicity of Prices
These proofs are given in parallel with the discussion in appendix A.
(Lemma 3, p.8) Let U∗t (s) be the expected future revenue earned starting at
time t in state s, for the optimal policy computed by Algorithm 2. Then the
function s 7→ U∗t (s) is monotone non-increasing in s for any t fixed.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the time, decreasing. At time t = T , there
is no future revenue and U∗T (s) = 0, so the inductive claim follows trivially.
Suppose, now, that the inductive claim holds at time t + 1. It suffices to show
that this holds for each u∗t (s, ℓ), since U
∗
t (s) is simply their expectation. Let π
∗
t
be the optimal pricing policy computed for the time t by the Algorithm 2. Since
the function µ 7→ Pr[V ≥ µ and E ], for any event E , is left-continuous in the
variable µ, we may define, for every ℓ ∈ L and s ∈ S,
µ′s := max
{
µ : Pr[V ≥ µ,D ≥ s|L = ℓ] ≥ Pr[V ≥ π∗t (s+1, ℓ), D ≥ s+1|L = ℓ]
}
We must have µ′ ≥ π∗t (s + 1, ℓ), as µ = π
∗
t (s + 1, ℓ) is in the set. Now, letting
p := Pr[V ≥ π∗t (s+ 1, ℓ), D ≥ s+ 1|L = ℓ], we have
u∗t (s+ 1, ℓ)
= p · π∗t (s+ 1, ℓ) + p · U
∗
t+1(s+ ℓ) + (1 − p)U
∗
t+1(s)
≤ p · π∗t (s+ 1, ℓ) + p · U
∗
t+1(s+ ℓ− 1) + (1 − p)U
∗
t+1(s− 1) (by induction)
≤ p ·
(
π∗t (s+ 1, ℓ) + U
∗
t+1(s+ ℓ− 1)− U
∗
t+1(s− 1)
)
+
+ U∗t+1(s− 1)
≤ Pr[V ≥ µ′s, D ≥ s] ·
(
µ′s + U
∗
t+1(s+ ℓ− 1)− U
∗
t+1(s− 1)
)
+
+ U∗t+1(s− 1)
≤ u∗t (s, ℓ) (subopt. price),
where (x)+ := max{x, 0}. The first inequality holds by the induction hypothesis,
the second is by definition of (·)+, the third by the definition of µ
′
s, and in the
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last, from the fact that µ′s is a (possibly) suboptimal pricing policy for the state
s at time t. Note that this last inequality requires that the 0 value be feasible in
the max, which it is, by setting µ′ arbitrarily large. ⊓⊔
(Lemma 4, p.8) If the distribution on job parameters satisfies assumption 1,
then for all ℓ, s, t, we have π∗t (s, ℓ) ≤ π
∗
t (s, ℓ+ 1).
Proof. Let pℓs(µ) := Pr[V ≥ µ,D ≥ s|L = ℓ], fix s, t, and ℓ, and let µ0 be equal
to the optimal price π∗t (s, ℓ). Observe that µ0 maximizes the expression
pℓs(µ)
(
µ+ U∗t+1(s+ ℓ− 1)− U
∗
t+1(s− 1)
)
+ U∗t+1(s− 1)
For simplicity, let ∆ℓ := U
∗
t+1(s+ ℓ− 1)− U
∗
t+1(s− 1), and so for any µ 6= µ0,
0 ≤ pℓs(µ0)
(
µ0 +∆ℓ
)
− pℓs(µ)
(
µ+∆ℓ
)
=
(
pℓs(µ0)− p
ℓ
s(µ)
)(
µ0 +∆ℓ
)
+ pℓs(µ)
(
µ0 − µ
)
Note that, as discussed in the proof of the previous lemma, µ0 + ∆ℓ ≥ 0, as
otherwise it would be beneficial to set π∗t (s, ℓ) ← ∞. The above inequality is
then equivalent to
pℓs(µ)− p
ℓ
s(µ0)
pℓs(µ)
≤
µ0 − µ
µ0 +∆ℓ
⇐⇒
pℓs(µ0)
pℓs(µ)
≥ 1−
µ0 − µ
µ0 +∆ℓ
We wish to show that, if µ ≤ µ0, then as ℓ increases, the above inequality still
holds. This would imply that the price µ0 =: π
∗
9(s, ℓ) gives better return than µ
for jobs of length ℓ+1, implying that the optimal price must be at least π∗t (s, ℓ),
which is our desired goal.
Now, by assumption 1, the left-hand-side is non-decreasing in ℓ, so it remains
to show that the right-hand-side is non-increasing in ℓ. The only changing term
is ∆ℓ, which by Lemma 3, is non-increasing in ℓ. Since it is in the denominator
of a subtracted, non-negative term, we have our desired result. ⊓⊔
B.3 Error of Estimation from Samples
(Lemma 5, p. 10) Let n, Q, and Qˆ, be as above. In the finite horizon, for all
ε > 0, if n ≥ 6TK4 log(2K/δ)/ε2, we have that with probability 1 − δ, |U∗t (s) −
Uˆ∗t (s)| < ε for all t, s. In the infinite horizon, if n ≥ 6K
4 log(2K/δ)/((1− γ)ε2),
we have that with probability 1− δ, |U∗(s)− Uˆ∗(s)| < ε for all s.
Proof. We begin by showing that, if |Q − Qˆ| ≤ ε, then with probability 1 − δ,
for all s and t, we have |U∗t (s)− Uˆ
∗
t (s)| ≤ 2(T − t)LVε. The result will follow as
a corollary of Ho¨ffding’s inequality for the right choice of n, and the discussion
in Section 4. (The error bound in the infinite horizon is |Uπ(s) − Uˆπ(s)| ≤
2VLε/(1− γ) with probability 1− δ, as shown in Appendix C.1, Corollary 1.)
Let π∗ be the policy computed by Algorithm 2 with access to Q. As in
Section 3, we denote pℓt,s := Pr[V ≥ π
∗
t (s, ℓ), D ≥ s|L = ℓ], and P (ℓ) :=
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PrX [L = ℓ]. We have discussed above how to estimate the values P (ℓ)p
ℓ
t,s, and
P (ℓ)(1 − pℓt,s), within an additive error of ε and 2ε, respectively.
In an abuse of notation, denote pˆℓt,s and Pˆ (ℓ) the estimated values of p
ℓ
t,s
and P (ℓ), respectively. We cannot estimate pℓt,s directly with good error bounds,
but we will only need the values Pˆ (ℓ)pˆℓt,s and Pˆ (ℓ)(1− pˆ
ℓ
t,s). Now, substituting
these estimates into (7), we get:∣∣∣U∗t (s)− Uˆ∗t (s)∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∑
ℓ∈L
P (ℓ)
(
pℓt,sπ
∗
t (s, ℓ) + p
ℓ
t,sU
∗
t+1(s+ ℓ− 1) + (1− p
ℓ
t,s)U
∗
t+1(s− 1)
)
−
∑
ℓ∈L
Pˆ (ℓ)
(
pˆℓt,sπ
∗
t (s, ℓ) + pˆ
ℓ
t,sUˆ
∗
t+1(s+ ℓ− 1) + (1− pˆ
ℓ
t,s)Uˆ
∗
t+1(s− 1)
)∣∣∣∣
To simplify this expression, we begin by showing a simple claim: Let x, y, xˆ,
yˆ ∈ R, and let λ, λˆ ∈ [0, 1], such that |x − xˆ| < δ, |y − yˆ| < δ, and |λ − λˆ| < ε.
Then ∣∣(λx+(1− λ)y)− (λˆxˆ+ (1 − λˆ)yˆ)∣∣
≤
∣∣(λx+ (1− λ)y)− (λˆx+ (1− λˆ)y)∣∣+∣∣(λˆx+ (1− λˆ)y)− (λˆxˆ+ (1− λˆ)yˆ)∣∣
≤ |λ− λˆ| · |x− y|+ λˆ|x− xˆ|+ (1 − λˆ)|y − yˆ|
≤ ε|x− y|+ δ
Now, replacing x and y with
(
π∗t (s, ℓ) + U
∗
t+1(s+ ℓ− 1)
)
and U∗t+1(s− 1),
respectively, and replacing λ with P (ℓ)pℓt,s, we have∣∣∣U∗t (s)− Uˆ∗t (s)∣∣∣ ≤∑
ℓ∈L
(
2ε · sup
σ
∣∣π∗t (σ, ℓ) + U∗t+1(σ + ℓ− 1)− U∗t+1(σ − 1)∣∣+
+ Pˆ (ℓ) · sup
σ′
∣∣∣U∗t+1(σ′)− Uˆ∗t+1(σ′)∣∣∣
)
(12)
However, the argument of the supremum in left-hand term in the summand must
be at most V, since if U∗t+1(σ + ℓ− 1) ≤ U
∗
t+1(s− 1), it is best to π
∗
t (σ) = ∞,
which makes pℓt,s = 0, putting all the weight on U
∗
t+1(s− 1). Furthermore, we
have shown in Lemma 3 that U∗t+1(s+ ℓ− 1) ≤ U
∗
t+1(s− 1). Thus, we get∣∣∣U∗t (s)− Uˆ∗t (s)∣∣∣ ≤ supσ′ ∣∣∣U∗t+1(σ′)− Uˆ∗t+1(σ′)∣∣∣+∑ℓ∈L 2εV
Inductively applying this gives
∣∣∣U∗t (s)− Uˆ∗t (s)∣∣∣ ≤ 2(T−t)LVε as desired. ⊓⊔
(Theorem 2, p. 11) Let X be a finite sequence of jobs sampled i.i.d. from an
underlying distribution Q, and let π be any monotone policy. Then, with proba-
bility 1− δ,
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|CmlRevT (X , π) − EX ′ [CmlRevT (X
′, π)]| ≤ V ·
√
2 log(2/δ)T .
in the finite horizon, and in the infinite-horizon-discounted,
|CmlRev∞(X , π) − EX ′ [CmlRevT (X
′, π)]| ≤ V ·
√
2 log(2/δ)/(1− γ2).
Proof. For the finite horizon, we apply Azuma’s inequality to the martingale
Rπt . We being by showing the bounded-differences property. Note that we do not
require truthful behaviour from the jobs, since taking strategic behaviour into
account for a non-monotone policy is equivalent to modifying the distribution
over the jobs, and making the distribution state-dependent, by increasing the
length of those jobs who would rather buy a longer interval. Thus,∣∣Rπt+1 −Rπt ∣∣
=
∣∣∣∑t+1τ=0 Revτ (π,X ) + EX>t+1 [∑Tτ=t+2 Revτ (π,X ) ∣∣∣ St+2(π,X≤t+1)]
−
∑t
τ=0 Revτ (π,X )− EX>t
[∑T
τ=t+1 Revτ (π,X )
∣∣∣ St+1(π,X≤t)] ∣∣∣
=
∣∣Revt+1(π,X ) − EXt+1 [Revt+1(π,X )|St+1(π,X≤t)]∣∣ ≤ V
where the last inequality follows from properties of conditional expectation.
With this property, we can apply Azuma’s, and get
|CmlRevT (X , π)− EX ′ [CmlRevT (X
′, π)]| ≤
√
2 log(2/δ)(T + 1)V2.
For the infinite-horizon-discounted, we observe that equation (9) becomes
Rπi =
i∑
t=0
γtRevt(π,X ) + EX>i
[∑T
t=i+1 γ
t
Revt(π,X )
∣∣∣ Si+1(π,X≤i)]
and thus we get that |Rπt −R
π
t−1| ≤ γ
t
V. Therefore with probability 1− δ,
|RπT −R
π
0 | ≤
√
2 log(2/δ)
∑T
t=0(γ
t
V)2 = V ·
√
2 log(2/δ)
∑T
t=0(γ
2)t
Thus, taking the limit as T →∞, we get that with probability 1− δ,
|CmlRev∞(X , π) − EX ′ [CmlRevT (X
′, π)]| ≤ V ·
√
2 log(2/δ)/(1− γ2). ⊓⊔
C Extensions
In this section, we extend the finite-horizon results to compute the optimal
policies in the infinite-horizon-discounted setting, and also to argue that the
optimal policy may be computed within some error when the distribution over
values is continuous, rather than discrete.
These results are needed to show the full statements of Theorems 1–5.
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C.1 Infinite Discounted Horizon
Recall, in this infinite horizon discounted setting, we seek to maximize the γ-
discounted future revenue,
CmlRev∞(X , π) :=
∞∑
t=0
γtRevt(X , π)
over the choice of π : N× S × L → R. Algorithm 2 does not allow us to imme-
diately compute a solution for the infinite discounted horizon case. However we
can exploit the discounting factor on the revenues to obtain an approximation
of the infinite optimum: it suffices to consider the truncated problem up to a
certain sufficiently large T and solve it optimally using the algorithm presented
above. In fact we have the following Lemma.
Lemma 7. For any ε > 0 and T ≥ logγ (ε(1− γ)/V), let π be the pricing
policy computed by the finite-horizon algorithm up to time T . Let π¯ be the time-
independent pricing policy such that π¯(·, ·) := π0(·, ·). Then the expected perfor-
mance of the optimal policy in the infinite horizon is within an additive ε of
expected performance of π¯.
Proof. Note that in order to compute policy π it is necessary to add the discount
factor to Algorithm 2, and to all of the proofs of previous sections. One can verify
that all proofs go through. Let π∗ be the Bayes-optimal infinite-horizon strategy
— which is known to be time-independent — and let π be as in the statement
(where we set πt(s, ℓ) = ∞ for all t > T .) Then, in expectation over times 0
through T , pricing as π yields greater revenue than following π∗. Conversely, in
expectation over all time, pricing as π∗ yields greater revenue than π. However,
after time T , the maximum possible revenue due to any policy is
∑∞
t=T γ
t · V = γT · V ·
(
1
1−γ
)
≤ ε
And so the difference in revenue due to following π or π∗ is at most ε, since T
is sufficiently large.
It remains to show that π¯ performs better than π overall. Let πi be the policy
which agrees with π0 for all t ≤ i, then equals πt−i for t > i. Observe that, π
1 is
optimal in expectation over the interval [1, T + 1], and is equivalent to π = π0
for the first step. Therefore, π1 performs better than π. Similarly, we can argue
πi+1 performs better than πi over the interval [i, T + i] and equally before, hence
performs better overall.
Thus, we have a sequence of policies π = π0, π1, π2, . . . converging to π¯,
and whose expected revenue is monotone non-decreasing along the sequence.
Therefore, the expected revenue due to π¯ is greater than that of π, which is an
ε additive-approximation to the optimal policy. ⊓⊔
The approach above is analogous to the classical value iteration technique [20].
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Corollary 1 (of Lemma 5). Let n, Q, Qˆ, P , p, Pˆ , and pˆ, be as in the proof
of Lemma 5, but for the infinite horizon discounted setting. Also, let U∗(s) and
Uˆ∗(s) be the infinite-horizon equivalents of the expected future revenue, indepen-
dent of time. Suppose |Qˆ − Qˆ| < ε. Then, with probability 1 − δ, for all s, we
have |Uπ(s)− Uˆπ(s)| ≤ 2VLε/(1− γ).
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 7, if T is sufficiently large, we may analyze the
first T time steps as a finite-horizon problem, and the remaining revenue will be
negligibly small. Now, the calculation above can be reproduced with discount
terms, to show
∣∣∣U∗t (s)− Uˆ∗t (s)∣∣∣ ≤ supσ′ ∣∣∣γU∗t+1(σ′)− γUˆ∗t+1(σ′)∣∣∣+∑ℓ∈L 2εV
Then, inductively applying this and taking T →∞, we have |U∗0 (s)− Uˆ
∗
0 (s)| ≤
2VLε/(1− γ). ⊓⊔
These results are used to prove the infinite-horizon versions of the various
results throughout the paper, specifically the Theorems 1–3, and 5.
C.2 Approximation Algorithm for Continuously Supported Values
Note that the algorithms above assume that the value of the jobs (V ) is discretely
supported, and the running time depends on |V|. In this section, we analyze the
error incurred by discretizing the space of possible values, and then computing
the optimal policy.
Let η > 0 be some desired small grid size, and suppose we only allow ourselves
to set prices which are multiples of η. We claim that this incurs a small loss on
the total revenue.
Define, as in the previous subsections, pℓs(µ) := Pr[V ≥ µ,D ≥ s|L = ℓ].
Further, define as previously U∗t (s) = EL [u
∗
t (s, L)], and
u∗t (s, ℓ) := max
µ∈R
[
pℓs(µ)
(
µ+ U∗t+1(s+ ℓ− 1)
)
+ (1− pℓs(µ))U
∗
t+1(s− 1)
]
Define U∗t,η(s) and u
∗
t,η(s, ℓ) similarly, restricting the maximum to choosing µ
from multiples of η.
Lemma 8. Let U∗t (·) and U
∗
t,η(·) be defined as above, then |U
∗
t (s) − U
∗
t,η(s)| ≤
(T − t)η ∀s, t.
Proof. We will show this by induction on the value of t, decreasing. Assume that
|U∗t (s) − U
∗
t,η(s)| < ∆t for all t, s, and set ∆T+1 = 0. We wish to inductively
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bound the value of ∆t. Now,
u∗t,η(s, ℓ)
= max
µ∈η·Z
[
pℓs(µ)
(
µ+ U∗t+1,η(s+ ℓ− 1)
)
+ (1− pℓs(µ))U
∗
t+1,η(s− 1)
]
≥ max
µ∈η·Z
[
pℓs(µ)
(
µ+ U∗t+1(s+ ℓ− 1)−∆t+1
)
+
+ (1− pℓs(µ))U
∗
t+1(s− 1)−∆t+1
]
= −∆t+1 + max
µ∈η·Z
[
pℓs(µ)
(
µ+ U∗t+1(s+ ℓ− 1)− U
∗
t+1(s− 1)
)
+ U∗t+1(s− 1)
]
Now, let µ∗ be the optimizer of this right hand side over R (where the value
would attain u∗t (s, ℓ)), and µˆ be µ
∗ rounded down to the nearest multiple of η.
Then, since pℓs(·) is non-increasing,
pℓs(µˆ)
(
µˆ+ U∗t+1(s+ ℓ− 1)− U
∗
t+1(s− 1)
)
+ U∗t+1(s− 1)
≥ pℓs(µ
∗)
(
µ∗ − η + U∗t+1(s+ ℓ− 1)− U
∗
t+1(s− 1)
)
+ U∗t+1(s− 1)
= u∗t (s, ℓ)− η · p
ℓ
s(µ
∗)
Thus combining both equations, we get
u∗t,η(s, ℓ) ≤ u
∗
t (s, ℓ) ≤ u
∗
t,η(s, ℓ) + η +∆t+1
From which we conclude, by averaging over ℓ, that ∆t ≤ (T − t)η, as desired. ⊓⊔
Corollary 2. Let U∗(·) and U∗∞,η(·) be defined as above, but for the infinite
horizon discounted, then |U∗(s)− U∗∞,η(s)| ≤ η/(1− γ) ∀s.
Proof. As shown in the previous subsection, it suffices to perform the analysis
in the finite horizon, while taking the discount factor into account, then take the
limit as T →∞. The same calculations as above gives
u∗t,η(s, ℓ)
≥ −∆t+1 + max
µ∈ηZ
[
pℓs(µ)
(
µ+ γU∗t+1(s+ ℓ− 1)− γU
∗
t+1(s− 1)
)
+ γU∗t+1(s− 1)
]
≥ u∗t+1(s, ℓ)− η − γ∆t+1
Summing the ∆’s and taking T → ∞, we get u∗∞,η(s, ℓ) ≥ u
∗(s, ℓ) − η/(1 − γ)
as desired. ⊓⊔
